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OHIO ADOPTS MINORITY VIEW IN REJECTING
SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS
Sherrow v. Brookover
174 Ohio St. 310, 189 N.E.2d 90 (1963)
A woman set up a trust for her son, grandson and granddaughter, pro-
viding that each was to receive fifteen-hundred dollars per year until the
granddaughter reached the age of 25. At that time the trust was to terminate
and the beneficiaries were each to receive 1/3 of the corpus should they then
be living. The trust contained a spendthrift clause which directed that neither
the principal nor the income of the trust should be subject to debts of the
beneficiaries, and which also prohibited the beneficiaries from alienating their
interests in the trust. A creditor obtained a judgment against the settlor's
son and sought to reach his interest in the trust. Both the trial court and
the court of appeals held that the spendthrift clause precluded the creditor
from reaching the son's interest. In a 4-to-3 decision, the Ohio Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the creditor could reach the son's interest, in
spite of the spendthrift clause.1 Ohio has thus taken the minority position
as to the validity of spendthrift trusts.2
The court's decision in the instant case was partially based on the prop-
osition that a property owner must find specific statutory exemption to
escape claims of creditors. In many areas such exemption has been authorized
for reasons of public policy.3 In the absence of statute or an express restric-
tion in a trust, a beneficiary may freely alienate his interest and creditors
may reach it.4 However, a majority of states have adopted the view that
where the terms of a trust provide that the beneficiary's interest shall not
be transferable by him nor subject to claims of his creditors, it is a valid
1 Sherrow v. Brookover, 174 Ohio St. 310, 189 N.E.2d 90 (1963). The court ex-
pressly left open the question of whether or not a provision restraining merely the
voluntary alienation would be valid.
2 2 Scott, Trusts § 152.1 (2d ed. 1956); Annot., 34 AJL.R.2d 1335 (1954).
3 E.g., Ohio Rev. Code § 3911.14 provides that the interest of a beneficiary of a
life insurance policy may not be reached by creditors. Similar exemption is provided
for amounts due from the State Teacher's Retirement System. Ohio Rev. Code § 3307.71.
4 2 Scott, Trusts § 132 (2d ed. 1956); Restatement (Second), Trusts § 132 (1959).
The court in the instant case did not refer to Ohio Rev. Code § 2333.01, which expressly
makes both legal and equitable interests subject to claims of a creditor. Two states have
held that a similar statute does enable a creditor to reach the beneficiary's interest,
Eastland v. Jordan, 3 Bibb 186 (Ky. 1813); Hutchinson v. Maxwell, 100 Va. 169,
40 S.E. 405 (1902), while two others held it to be procedural only and not relevant to
the validity of a spendthrift trust. Presley v. Rodgers, 24 Miss. 520 (1852); Guernsey
v. Lazear, 51 W.Va. 328, 41 S.E. 405 (1902).
Section 2333.01 has been ignored in most of the prior Ohio cases relating to spend-
thrift trusts. However, one court held that the statute did not give a creditor the right
to reach the beneficiary's interest in a discretionary trust, reasoning that the statute applied
only to vested interests. Morris v. Daiker, 35 Ohio App. 394, 172 N.E. 540 (1929).
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restraint on the voluntary and involuntary transfer of his interest.5 This
type of trust is commonly termed a spendthrift trust.
It is important to distinguish the spendthrift trust from those trusts
which may also be immune from attacks by creditors, but to which different
reasoning is applicable. One of these is the discretionary trust, which nor-
mally provides that the amount to be received by the beneficiary is dependent
entirely upon the discretion of the trustee. Since the beneficiary could not
force the trustee to make a distribution, it is commonly held that the creditor
is also powerless to reach the undistributed funds.6 Similar reasoning pre-
cludes a successful action by the creditor of a beneficiary of a support trust,
which usually provides that the trustee is to pay the income to the beneficiary
only for his education or support.7 In the instant case Mr. Chief Justice
Taft, writing for the majority, emphasized that the court was not passing on
the question of whether or not a creditor would be able to reach the bene-
ficiary's interest in a discretionary trust or a trust for support, but confined
the reasoning to the spendthrift trust where the beneficiary would have "con-
tinuing and enforceable rights to obtain some direct tangible benefit."'8
The spendthrift trust clause first gained acceptance in this country in
Pennsylvania,9 and is now a standard provision in many trust instruments.
Mr. Justice Miller gave the spendthrift trust its greatest impetus in a dictum
in Nichols v. Eaton,'0 in which he advocated the validity of spendthrift trusts.
Gray"' made a vigorous attack on their validity, but his work apparently had
little effect on the courts.
Since the instant case is the first in which the Ohio Supreme Court
has ruled directly on the validity of a spendthrift trust, it is understandable
that the prior decisions were in a state of confusion. Dicta in the early
5 Restatement (Second), Trusts § 152 (1959); Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 1335 (1954);
Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts (2d ed. 1947) (hereinafter cited as Griswold). It should
be noted that after the beneficiary has received income from the trustee he may freely
transfer and his creditors may reach it, even in those states which uphold the validity
of spendthrift trusts. Young's Estate, 17 Pa. Dist. 597 (1907).
6 E.g., Watts v. McKay, 160 Kan. 377, 162 P.2d 82 (1945).
7 Restatement (Second), Trusts § '154 (1959).
8 Sherrow v. Brodkover, supra note 1, at 312, 189 N.E.2d at 92. It would seem
quite likely that when faced with a discretionary trust or a trust for support that the
Ohio Supreme Court would deny access by the creditor due to the entirely different
reasoning involved. This is the view even in the minority states which allow creditors
to reach the true spendthrift trust. Calloway v. Smith, 300 Ky. 55, 186 S.W.2d 642
(1945) (discretionary trust); Thurber v. Thurber, 43 R.I. 504, 112 Aft. 209 (1921) (trust
for support).
The same result has been reached in several Ohio cases. Morris v. Daiker, 35 Ohio
App. 394, 172 N.E. 540 (1929); Brooks v. Hanna, 19 Ohio C.C.R. 216, 10 Ohio C.C.
Dec. 480 (1899); Brinker v. Speer, 8 Ohio Dec. Reprint 755, 9 Weekly L. Bull. 292
(1883); Brooks v. Raynolds, 59 F. 923 (6th Cir. 1894).
9 See Griswold, § 26, for a collection of early Pennsylvania cases.
1o 91 U.S. 716 (1875).
11 Gray, Restraints on Alienation §§ 214-218 (2d ed. 1895).
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cases, particularly Hobbs v. Smith,12 indicated that spendthrift trusts would
be invalid. In Thorton v. Stanley,'3 the court recognized that a conflict
existed regarding their validity, but did not reach the issue since the trust did
not manifest an intention to restrain alienation. Later courts, probably in-
fluenced by the increasing number of jurisdictions in which spendthrift
trusts were upheld, either assumed their validity or else the issue was not
raised.14 Frazier v. Wilkinson'15 was regarded by one commentator1 6 as the
"highest judicial approval" of spendthrift trusts in Ohio, although there is
some doubt as to whether a true spendthrift trust was created. In two recent
decisions the trial courts assumed that spendthrift trusts were valid in Ohio,
but differed as to whether or not the wife of the beneficiary would be able
to reach his interest. 17
Courts apparently uphold spendthrift trusts on the theory that the donor
has a right to dispose of his property as he sees fit. The beneficiary's circum-
stances do not enter into consideration.' 8 It has often been stated that the
beneficiary need not be improvident nor incompetent in order for a court
to sustain the validity of the trust. 19 Courts adopting the majority rule
further reason that the creditor has no cause for complaint because he could
have discovered the debtor's income source through the exercise of diligence
and should not have extended credit on the basis of trust income.
The minority rule is premised mainly on the principle that a creditor
has the right to receive satisfaction from the debtor's property.20 Critics
12 15 Ohio St. 419 (1864). The court said that both legal and equitable interests
should be subject to payment of debts, although only a legal interest was before the
court.
13 55 Ohio St. 199, 45 N.E. 318 (1897).
14 In Adair v. Sharp, 49 Ohio App. 507, 197 N.E. 399 (1934), the court assumed that
spendthrift trusts were valid in Ohio, although only a discretionary trust was involved.
See also Babcock v. Moneypeny, 34 Ohio C.C. Dec. 434 (1911) and Madden v. Shallen-
barger, 121 Ohio St. 401, 169 N.E. 450 (1929) (trusts had spendthrift clauses but their
validity was not challenged).
15 10 Ohio C.C. Dec. 106 (1889). But see 49 Ohio Jur. 2d Spendthrifts, § 8, sug-
gesting that the court was stretching the language to find a true spendthrift trust. See
also Skillman v. Symmes, 14 Ohio C.C.R. 547, 7 Ohio C.C. Dec. 39 (1896), where
it was held that a testator had the power to preclude creditors of a legatee from gaining
access to the legacy while still in the hands of the administrator.
10 Comment, "The Spendthrift Trust in Ohio-Rejection or Recognition," 27 U.
Cinc. L. Rev. 287, 288 (1958). For detailed examination of the Ohio cases see also
Comment, "Spendthrift Trusts and Indestructible Trusts in Ohio," 2 U. Cinc. L. Rev.
333 (1928) and Griswold, § 213.
17 McWilliams v. McWilliams, 2 Ohio Op. 2d 77, 140 N.E.2d 80 (C.P. 1956) denied
attachment. "We believe that a person . . . has the right to dispose of it as he
wishes ...and this power of disposition is limited only by some lawful prohibition
or as being against public policy." Id. at 78, 140 N.E.2d at 81. Contra, O'Connor v.
O'Connor, 3 Ohio Op. 2d 186, 141 N.E.2d 691 (C.P. 1957).
18 Broadway Nat'l Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170 (1882).
10 Griswold, § 262.
20 Brahmey v. Rollins, 87 N.H. 290, 179 At. 186 (1935).
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of the majority position correctly point out that in numerous instances the
right of the donor to dispose of his property has been limited where other
policy considerations are present. Further, courts are nearly unanimous in
holding that restraints may not be imposed upon legal interests.2 ' Finally,
as stated by Mr. Chief Justice Taft in the instant case, creditor's rights
should not be made to depend on the exercise of diligence at the time of
extension of credit if the debtor has property from which their claims may be
satisfied.
22
Many special classes of claimants have been permitted to reach the
beneficiary's interest. The Restatement 23 and most courts would permit
access to the beneficiary's interest on behalf of his wife or child for support,
or by his wife for alimony. Claims for necessaries furnished the beneficiary
and claims of a state or of the United States have been allowed.24 Also,
courts are unanimous in holding that protection is not available where the
settlor of the trust is also the beneficiary. 25 Finally, there is some indication
that a person having a tort claim may be able to reach the beneficiary's
interest. 26
In addition to judicially created limitations on the immunity of spend-
thrift trusts, a number of states have enacted statutes which enable creditors
to reach the beneficiary's interest in certain situations. Some of these statutes
permit complete access to surplus trust income,27 while some authorize cred-
itors to reach only a percentage of trust income.28
After more than a century of debate on the validity of spendthrift trusts
it is clear that the solution is not at the extremes but somewhere in the
middle. Policy considerations can be found that add weight to the reasoning
of both the majority and minority adherents. One can certainly sympathize
with the creditor who is unable to recover even though the beneficiary is well
provided for.29 At the other extreme, it is clearly undesirable to let the bene-
ficiary become a ward of the state if he is improvident. After assessing the
competing factors, Griswold maintained that the question is entirely one of
21 Griswold, § 633.
22 Sherrow v. Brookover, supra note 1, at 313, 189 N.E.2d at 93.
23 Restatement (Second), Trusts § 157 (1959).
24 Donalds v. Plumb, 8 Conn. 447 (1831) (necessaries furnished); Matter of
Rosenberg, 269 N.Y. 247, 199 N.E. 206 (1935) (lien for unpaid federal taxes); Restate-
ment (Second), Trusts § 157(b) and (d) (1959).
25 2 Scott, Trusts § 156 (2d ed. 1956).
26 Note, "Attachability of a Beneficiary's 1nterest in Satisfaction of a Tort Claim,"
28 Notre Dame Law. 509 (1952).
27 N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 98 subjects trust surplus in excess of sums needed for
education and support to claims of creditors. See also La. Rev. Stat. § 9:1923 (1950) (in-
come in excess of $5,000).
28 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 5205(e) (1).
29 In Congress Hotel Co. v. Martin, 312 Ill. 318, 143 N.E. 838 (1924), a creditor
could not recover for necessaries furnished even though the trust income for the year
exceeded $171,000.
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policy, the solution of which "is more appropriately a function of the legis-
lature than of the courts. ' °30
The Ohio General Assembly now has an excellent opportunity to weigh
the policy considerations applicable to spendthrift trusts and to permit them
within specified limits. A statute could be patterned after Griswold's Model
Act,31 which has been adopted in Louisiana3 2 and Oklahoma,3 3 with some
modification. The Model Act permits express restraints on the voluntary and
involuntary alienation of the beneficiary's interest in the income. Access
to the beneficiary's interest would be permitted in the following three situ-
ations:
(1) All income in excess of $5,000 per year would be attachable by a
creditor and freely alienable by the beneficiary.
(2) Ten per cent of weekly income in excess of $12 could be reached
by creditors of the beneficiary.
(3) The court would have discretionary power to grant relief to special
creditors, such as for the support of the beneficiary's spouse or
child, for necessaries furnished the beneficiary, and for tort claims.
Such a statute would seem to be a desirable means of recognizing the
competing interests of the donor's right to dispose of his property as he sees
fit, and the right of the beneficiary's creditor to obtain satisfaction. Until
such legislation is enacted, the Ohio attorney might consider using a dis-
cretionary trust to fulfill the desire of a settlor who wishes to impose some
restraint on the beneficiary's interest.
30 Griswold, § 556, at 639: "There are situations in which spendthrift trusts ad-
mittedly serve a useful function. . . . The difficulty comes not so much from the
existence of spendthrift trusts as from their generally unrestrained extent. The argument
for and against such trusts may in a large measure be reconciled by legislation expressly
authorizing them of a fixed and moderate amount, while allowing creditors to reach
all income in excess of a specified amount."
31 Griswold, § 565.
32 La. Rev. Stat. § 9:1923 (1950).
33 Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 60, § 175.25 (1963).
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